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TO THE MILLENNIUM: EMERGING ISSUES
FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND CYBERSPACE
CARL W. CHAMBERLIN*
The approach of the millennium brings novel issues of law
that arise from the evolution of technology. The most celebrated
of these issues-the "Millennium Bug" or Year 2000 problem-
arose from technological limitations that computer program-
mers faced decades ago. Because of limitations in the amount of
information computers could store, programmers decided to
identify years using two digits ("99") instead of four ("1999"). As
a result, computer systems may read the year 2000 as 1900, caus-
ing systems to crash or falter at the turn of the century. Com-
puter and software vendors, manufacturers of medical
equipment, traffic controls and other products containing
embedded chips, state and federal governments, banks and bro-
kerage houses, and corporate officers and directors all face
claims for losses caused by the year 2000 ('Y2K") phenomenon.
Companies will collectively spend billions to trillions of dollars
over the next few years to correct Y2K problems, defend against
Y2K litigation, and comply with Y2K-related government
regulations.1
* Of Counsel and Chair of the Internet & Computer Litigation Group at
the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP; Adjunct Professor at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and the Santa Clara
University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution
to this article by Samuel P. O'Rourke of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.
The views expressed herein are not necessarily the views of Orrick, Herrington
& Sutcliffe LLP or its clients.
1. Federal and state governments have responded to the Y2K threat with
a variety of measures. The Internal Revenue Service has announced rules
concerning the tax treatment of costs of developing, purchasing or leasing Y2K
remediation software. Rev. Proc. 97-50, 1997-4S I.R.B. 8. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has addressed the disclosure obligations regarding
anticipated costs and liabilities arising out of Y2K problems. See, e.g., Statement
of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences
by Public Companies, Investment Advisors, Investment Companies, and
Municipal Securities Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 7558, [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,041 (July 29, 1998), also available at <http://www.
sec.gov/rules/concept/33_7558.htm>. The Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC), which oversees many of the financial institutions
operating in the United States, has promulgated guidelines on how financial
institutions should prepare testing procedures. See, e.g., Federal Fin. Insts.
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Meanwhile, new legal issues proliferate as the world turns to
the Internet for communication, entertainment, and commerce.
Never before have so many people had such extensive, instanta-
neous, and inexpensive access to so many other people across the
globe. Because the Internet may be accessed anywhere in the
world, individuals and companies who post messages or conduct
commerce on the World Wide Web may unwittingly subject
themselves to foreign laws in distant jurisdictions. Because only
one person or entity may use any particular Web site address,
trademark law takes on new significance. Enforcement of copy-
right law is more difficult, yet more important, due to the ease of
copying material on the Internet and the high quality of digital
copies. Contract law must be adapted to recognize the advent of
online "paperless" transactions, for which there are neither writ-
ings nor signatures. Traditional privacy protection laws must
accommodate the transfer of information through cyberspace.
This article surveys some of the more salient issues to be
resolved in the dawn of the twenty-first century. Part I discusses
the Millennium Bug, including likely causes of action, litigation
to date, and legislation. Part II addresses issues arising out of the
Internet, including personal jurisdiction, the assignment of
domain names, liability for Web site content, proposed guide-
lines for electronic contracting under Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2B, and privacy issues.
I. THE "MILLENNIUM BUG"
In the 1950s and 1960s, computer memory had limited
capacity. Programmers decided to conserve memory by identify-
ing years with two digits instead of four, such as "99" instead of
"1999." As the next century approaches, the significance of this
programming shorthand has become apparent. Because many
computer systems will misread the "00" in the year 2000, many
systems will produce errors or crash.
The Y2K problem is widespread. Hundreds of thousands of
companies have "legacy" computer systems comprised of main-
frame software applications that contain two-digit date fields.
Because these applications were typically written with little docu-
mentation originally, and have been patched and modified with
new code over the years, the applications tend to be difficult to
understand and correct. Personal computers may also pose Y2K
Examination Council, GUIDANCE TESTING FOR YEAR 2000 READINESS (Apr. 10,
1998) <http://www.ffiec.gov/y2k/guidance.htm>.
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problems, but to a lesser extent.2 Standalone software packages
or off-the-shelf software may also present Y2K problems. If these
computer systems produce errors or fail altogether, there will be
widespread disruption in the flow and processing of information
and commerce.
To solve the majority of Y2K problems in computers, the
software code must be altered or replaced so that the dates in the
year 2000 and later are properly recognized. The task is omi-
nous. Although some software programs automate the process
of locating and correcting Y2K problems, much of the solution
will involve the painstaking rewriting of millions of lines of code.'
Even after the code is corrected, all the data and the procedures
which handle it must be tested and refined so that both "old"
and 'Year 2000 compliant" data are correctly produced, sent, and
received. Moreover, businesses must be concerned not only with
their own systems, but also with the systems of their suppliers,
vendors, customers, and others with whom they interact.4
Computers will not be the sole source of Y2K problems.
Most sophisticated appliances and equipment, including power
plants, fire protection systems, medical devices, security systems,
elevator controls, time-dependent lighting and HVAC systems,
telephone systems, and electronic time locks are "embedded sys-
tems," containing microprocessors programmed with code.5 A
2. See Karl W. Feilder, Unloved and Forgotten: Year 2000 and Microcomputers,
in YEAR 2000 PROBLEM: STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS FROM THE FORTUNE 100, 30,
31 (Leon A. Kappelman ed., 1997). See also Ed Bolt & Woody Leonhard,
Crashproof Your PC, PC COMPUTING, Oct. 1998, at 182-84 (discussing Y2K issues
with Windows and Internet Explorer); Michael J. Miller, It's Time to Act on Y21,
PC MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1998, at 4 (discussing Y2K issues on desktop machines).
3. There are several approaches to correcting the code. First, the year
field could be expanded to four digits, instead of two. This is the most
permanent solution, but the most costly to implement. Second, programmers
could leave the two-digit year field in tact, but employ "windowing techniques"
by which the system interprets and converts the dates. (For example, all two-
digit years from 50-99 might be viewed as 1950-99, and all two-digit dates of 00-
49 would be interpreted as 2000-2049). Third, unused bits in the two-digit date
code could be changed to try to fit the four-digit year into the two-digit year
data space. Fourth, data and programs can be "encapsulated," by which the
dates in date files are time-shifted (backward and forward 28 years) during
processing.
4. Complicating the Y2K solution somewhat is the fact that the Year 2000
is also a leap year, which Y2K fixes must accommodate as well. In addition,
some tape library management systems use the "99" date code to activate special
instructions, such as destroying the tape library. Problems arising from this
programming convention will be seen in 1999.
5. See Harold Carruthers, So You Can't Program Your VCR?, in YEAR 2000:
BEST PRACTICES FOR Y2K MILLENNIUM COMPUTING, 36-39 (Dick Lefkon ed.,
1998).
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failure of these systems could cause substantial personal injury as
well as economic losses.6 Because the code in embedded systems
is usually not upgradeable or accessible to those who own and
operate the systems, a non-compliant embedded system usually
must be replaced rather than corrected.
Companies will spend billions to trillions in assessing and
remedying their computer systems and litigating Y2K claims.7 It
is estimated that the costs of becoming Y2K compliant will reach
$2 billion for the airline industry alone,' and $3 billion for the
securities industry.' Total cost estimates for correcting the Y2K
problem range from $300-600 billion or more worldwide.' °
Others estimate that the total cost, including legal fees and litiga-
tion judgments, will reach $1.6 trillion. 1
Throughout the world, businesses and governments are
behind the pace necessary to resolve the Y2K problem before the
turn of the century. As of 1998, only a third of the companies in
the world had started to address the Y2K problem. 12 Nearly half
of the companies with a Y2K problem will not become Y2K com-
pliant in time to avoid having all or part of their computer sys-
6. Y2K problems may affect a wide variety of services, causing mild
inconveniences or more severe disruptions for which the Red Cross has
proposed comprehensive planning. For a good overview from a lay perspective,
see the Red Cross Web site at <http://www.redcross.org/disaster/safety/
y2k.html>. The extent of predicted disruptions is addressed in Matt Beer, Y2K
Bug: Dud or Disaster? SAN FRAN. EXAM'R, Dec. 27, 1998, at Cl.
7. See Steven H. Goldberg, Managing Year 2000 Risks for Hospitals and
Health Care Systems, MED. MALPRACTICE AND STRATEGv, June 1998, at 1.
8. See Mark Odell, 2000 Anyone? A Real Date Oddity, AIRLINE Bus., Dec.
1996, at 22.
9. See Sarah Stirland, Millennium Will Bring Huge Computer Upgrading Bills,
THE BOND BUYER, June 7, 1996, at 3.
10. The Gartner Group, Inc., an information technology research firm,
has estimated that it will cost that much. See "Year 2000" Problem Gains
National Attention, Bus. Wire Plus, Apr. 24, 1996 available at <http://www.
gartnerl 1.gartnerweb.com/public/static/aboutgg/pressrel/pry2000.html>.
11. See Capers Jones, Global Impacts of the Year 2000 Problem, in YEAR 2000
PROBLEM: STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS FROM THE FORTUNE 100, supra note 2, at
12.
12. Only 35% of all companies surveyed by Arthur Andersen in the
United States and Europe during the first half of 1997 had begun the process of
developing a plan and inventorying their systems. BRIAN CASEY, MINET GROUP
REPORT, THE MILLENNIUM PROBLEM: AN OVERVIEW AND INSURANCE SOLUTION
(Jan. 1997). The Gartner Group's survey of 87 countries estimated that 23% of
those companies had not started Y2K efforts. Year 2000 Global State of Readiness
and Risks to the General Business Community: Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm.
on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, 105th Cong. (Oct. 7, 1998) (Statement of
Lou Marcoccio, Gartner Group Research Director) [hereinafter Year 2000
Hearings].
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tems shut down or falter. 13 Only 17 percent of technology and
business executives are confident that the Y2K problem will be
fixed in time.14
A. Causes of Action
Y2K-related errors will disrupt business, transportation, and
the flow of information and communications around the world.
Many individuals and businesses will seek relief in lawsuits based
on a variety of claims in contract and tort, as well as claims under
securities laws and consumer statutes.
1. Breach of Contract or Warranty
Hardware and software vendors typically sell or license prod-
ucts pursuant to written contracts. Written contracts also set
forth the terms by which companies provide maintenance of
hardware and software systems and consultants provide Y2K solu-
tions. Claims based on these contracts may be asserted if the
hardware or software is not Y2K compliant, computer systems do
not perform without interruption, or consultants fail to fix the
problem or inject further error into the code.
For the most part, claims based on contracts to sell goods
such as hardware or software are subject to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC).1 5 Claims based on contracts for the rendi-
tion of services are governed by common law. In either case, it
may be difficult to identify a particular contract provision by
which the defendant undertook to provide a Y2K compliant
product. Until the last few years, contracts rarely mentioned Y2K
issues.
In the absence of a contract provision addressing Y2K com-
pliance specifically, plaintiffs will argue that Y2K-related
problems reflect a breach of an express or implied warranty. For
example, in every sales contract there is an implied warranty that
the product complies with the description by which it was sold.1 6
Plaintiffs will argue that a Y2K failure breaches a warranty that
the product will perform in conformity with the product specifi-
13. See Year 2000 Hearings, supra note 12.
14. SeeJim Seymour, What to Do About the Year 2000, PC MAGAZINE, Oct. 6,
1998, at 112 (citing April 1998 poll by CIO Magazine).
15. The formation, terms, and enforceability of a contract for the lease or
sale of computer software may be governed by proposed U.C.C. Article 2B.
U.C.C. Article 2B (Proposed Draft December 1998) (visited Jan. 11, 1999)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2b/ucc2bALId98.htm> See also
infra notes 181-87, 191-92, and accompanying text.
16. See Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 278 P.2d 723, 725 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1955).
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cations. U.C.C. § 2-314 recognizes an implied warranty that the
goods are "merchantable" in the sense of being fit for their ordi-
nary purpose. Among the ordinary purposes of software and
hardware is the processing of data irrespective of the date.
U.C.C. § 2-315 recognizes an implied warranty that the goods are
fit for the particular purpose that the buyer has for the product,
as long as the seller knows of it. Purchasers of computer hard-
ware and software may have articulated at the time of purchase a
need for the software to continue functioning into the twenty-
first century.
17
2. Fraud or Negligent Misrepresentation
Hardware and software vendors may be sued for fraud or
negligent misrepresentation if they falsely represented that their
products were Y2K compliant. Even if vendors did not make
direct representations of Y2K compliance, such representations
may be implied from marketing or other statements that the
product would continue functioning long into the future.
To establish a fraud claim, a plaintiff must show a represen-
tation of material fact, knowledge of falsity, intent to deceive,
actual and justifiable reliance, and damage proximately caused
by the fraud.'" In the Y2K context, it may be difficult to establish
that the vendor had an intent to defraud, particularly if the trans-
action occurred years ago when Y2K issues were not readily
apparent. Plaintiffs may alternatively assert claims for negligent
misrepresentation, which does not require a showing of intent,
but merely that the defendant made false statements without rea-
sonable grounds to believe they were true.19
17. Under the Uniform Commercial Code a seller may disclaim implied
warranties of merchantability if the disclaimer is conspicuous. U.C.C. § 2-
316(2); but see Patton v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1041 (D.C. Super. 1990) (section 2-316 implied warranty of
merchantability may not be excluded or modified as to consumer goods under
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.2(2)). Limitations on disclaimers of warranties are
further set forth in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act (Lemon Law), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1994). The Act requires
that written warranties for consumer products disclose their terms fully and
conspicuously. In addition, the Act restricts durational limits of implied
warranties and renders ineffective any disclaimer, modification or limitation
made in violation of the Act. Id. § 2308 (1994).
18. See McDermott v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 746 F. Supp. 1016,
1022 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Adkins v. Wyckoff, 313 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957).
19. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1710(2) (West 1998); § 1572(2) (West 1982);
Masters v. San Bernardino Cty. Employees Retirement Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
860, 867 n. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 745 (5th ed. 1984). The remedies for
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3. Product Liability
Manufacturers face strict liability for physical harm caused
by defects in the manufacture or design of a product.2" Manufac-
turers also face strict liability for failing to warn of a substantial
danger that would not be readily recognized by an ordinary con-
sumer." Because physical harm will more likely arise from the
malfunction of embedded systems, the manufacturers of embed-
ded systems are more likely to confront strict liability claims.
There is no recovery for economic loss under strict products lia-
bility theory.2 2
4. Negligence
Y2K defendants may be sued for negligence, on the theory
that they knew or should have known that their products could
cause damage because they were not Y2K compliant, yet failed to
take reasonable steps to protect against that harm.
In determining whether a defendant's actions were reason-
able, courts will likely consider the standards and practice in the
industry, the extent to which the defendant complied with any
applicable government regulations, the practicability of addi-
tional efforts toward Y2K compliance, and the information
known to the defendant and to the industry generally. Again,
transactions conducted long ago are less likely to be the subject
of liability. In the 1950s-70s, it was industry practice for software
developers to minimize the amount of data, such as date fields,
to be stored in memory. Furthermore, software developers at the
time did not know that the software would still be used in the
twenty-first century.
negligent misrepresentation, however, are more limited than the remedies for
fraud. With negligent misrepresentation, the class of persons entitled to rely
upon the representation is restricted to those to whom the misrepresentations
were made. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) cmts. g, h (1977).
Furthermore, punitive damages may be available if the false representations
were made intentionally, but not if they were made negligently. See CAL. CrV.
CODE § 3294 (West 1997).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). Under the
Restatement view, the plaintiff must prove that the product was unreasonably
dangerous to use. Id. In California, the plaintiff need only prove that the
product was defective. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Corp., 573 P.2d 443, 451 (Cal.
1978) (design defect); Cronin v. I.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal.
1972) (manufacturing defect).
21. See Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1151-52 (Cal. 1984).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
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5. Securities Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Y2K problems may harm the business operations of a public
company to the point that its stock price declines. Some compa-
nies may fail altogether due to Y2K problems. If officers and
directors of a company fail to take appropriate steps to protect
the company (and its shareholders) from losses stemming from
Y2K problems, they may be personally liable for common law
breach of fiduciary duty or violation of their statutory obligations
to shareholders. 2 Suits may be based on a failure to assess the
company's systems, to consider the readiness of suppliers or cus-
tomers, or to perform Y2K due diligence in purchasing another
company.
Liability may also arise under the federal securities laws for
failing to disclose or accurately represent a public company's Y2K
status. The Securities Act of 1933 requires public companies to
make certain disclosures in publicly filed reports, including a
"Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations" ("MD&A"). Companies must disclose
in the MD&A any "material events and uncertainties known to
management that would cause reported financial information
not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of
future financial condition. '24 Non-compliant systems or uncer-
tainties surrounding the Y2K compatibility of company systems
or vendors may be sufficiently material to require disclosure.
The Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") has recently
set forth stringent requirements for Y2K disclosures. Under its
July 29, 1998 Securities Act Release No. 7558, entitled "Statement
of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and
Consequences by Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Invest-
23. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959,
967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("The directors allowed a situation to develop and
continue which exposed the corporation to enormous legal liability and that in
so doing, they violated their duty to be active monitors of corporate
performance."); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1998) ("A director shall
perform the duties of a director.., in good faith, in a manner such director
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and
with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would use under similar circumstances.").
24. Reg. S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1998). The required MD&A
disclosure would likely constitute forward-looking statements, such as
projections of business interruptions and remediation and testing costs. Such
statements would obtain "safe-harbor" protection from liability if accompanied
by "meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement." 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (1) (A)(i) (Supp. 1 1995).
EMERGING ISSUES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND CYBERSPACE
ment Companies, and Municipal Securities Issuers,"25 a company
must disclose information concerning its Y2K status if its assess-
ment of Y2K problems is not complete, or if management deter-
mines that its Y2K problems will have a material effect on the
company's business, results of operations, or financial condi-
tions, without taking into account the company's efforts to avoid
those consequences.26 According to the Release, a company
must assume that it will not be Y2K compliant in the absence of
clear evidence of readiness, and it must assume that material
third parties will not be Y2K compliant unless the third parties
have delivered written assurances that they expect to be Y2K
compliant in time. 27 If required to make a disclosure, the com-
pany must state (1) the company's degree of Y2K readiness in
plain English sufficient to enable investors to fully understand
the company's status, (2) material historical and estimated costs
of Y2K remediation, (3) the risks confronting the company,
including estimated worst-case scenarios and any uncertainty
regarding the effect of Y2K problems, and (4) the company's
contingency plans to handle worst-case scenarios.
28
The failure to disclose the effects of Y2K problems could
expose a company and its officers and directors to shareholder
actions and both civil and criminal liability. Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 provides a private cause of action for mate-
rial misstatements or omissions in registration reports. 29 Sec-
tion 12 of the 1933 Act provides a cause of action for
misstatements or omissions of material facts in a prospectus or
oral communication."0 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 creates an implied cause of action for untrue state-
25. Securities Act Release No. 7558, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,041 (July 29, 1988), also available at <http://www.sec.gov/rules/
concept/33_7558.htm>.
26. See id. 80,723. The standard for materiality is whether the
disclosure "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
27. Securities Act Release No. 7558, supra note 25, 80,728.
28. Id. 80,729. Release Number 33-7558 superseded the SEC's Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 5, issued by the Divisions of Corporation Finance and
Investment Management. As modified January 12, 1998, the Bulletin stated
that a public company determining that its Y2K issues were material may have
to disclose the company's plans to address the Y2K issues and the total cost of
remediation. Divs. of Corp. Fin. & Inv. Mgmt., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 5
(CF/IM) (Revised Jan. 12, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/
slbcf5.htm>.
29. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
30. Id. at § 771(a) (1994).
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ments or omissions of fact in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security."
6. Deceptive Trade Practices, Unfair Competition, and Other
Business Torts
Manufacturers and maintenance organizations may face lia-
bility for false advertising if their products or services do not
meet the standards set by their advertising. Section 43(a) of the
federal Lanham Act32 provides that any person who uses a false
or misleading description or representation in connection with
goods or services is liable to anyone damaged thereby.3 3 To pre-
vail, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's statement was
(1) false or misleading, (2) in interstate commerce, (3) in con-
nection with goods or services, (4) in commercial advertising or
promotion, (5) misrepresentative of the nature, qualities, or geo-
graphic origin of the goods, services, or commercial activities,
and (6) actually or likely damaging to the plaintiff. 4 In addition,
under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"),3 5 the FTC
may enjoin "[u]nfair methods of competition" and "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce."3 6 Deception exists if
31. Claims under § 10(b) require proof of intent to deceive or
recklessness. Id. at § 78j(b) (1994). Claims under §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act
merely require proof of a lack of diligence. Id. at §§ 77k, 771(a) (1994).
32. Trademark (Lanham) Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 441 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)).
33. Id. Remedies for a violation of the Lanham Act include injunctive
relief, damages, and, in some cases, attorneys' fees. In order to obtain damages
(for a misleading rather than false statement), the plaintiff must establish that
the violation caused actual consumer confusion or deception. See Tambrands,
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Attorneys' fees may be awarded only in an "exceptional" case, such as a case of
deliberative and willful infringement. See id. at 1198.
34. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 27:24, at 27-39 (4th ed. 1998). See also Valu Eng'g Inc. v. Nolu
Plastics, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1990); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v.
Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (D. Ariz. 1981). If the defendant's
advertisement is found to be literally false, the plaintiff need not prove that the
advertising left a false impression on the buying public. See Coca Cola Co. v.
Tropicana Products, Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982). If the
advertisement is literally true, the plaintiff cannot prevail unless it proves that
the advertisement was nevertheless deceptive or misleading, by showing it was
likely to influence purchasing decisions and it had a tendency to deceive the
customer. See Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 597,
600 (D. Del. 1989).
35. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4145 (1994)).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1). Actions under the FTCA may be brought only
by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). The FTC may issue a cease and
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"there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to
the consumer's detriment. '3 7 State statutes similarly prohibit
unfair competition, consumer fraud, and false advertising."8
7. Indemnification Claims
Companies and individuals potentially liable to others for
Y2K losses may bring suits against third parties for indemnifica-
tion. For example, manufacturers of embedded systems, sued by
those who have been injured by the system's Y2K malfunction,
may bring claims for indemnity against the chip manufacturer or
software vendor who provided components for the system.
Indemnification may be based on a provision in a written con-
tract between the defendant and a third party, or on equitable
principles that losses should be divided among joint tortfeasors
according to their proportionate fault.39
B. Litigation to Date
So far, Y2K litigation has been based on a variety of contract,
warranty, and consumer protection claims. The first publicized
Y2K lawsuit-Produce Palace International v. TEC-America Corp.4°-
was filed in Michigan by a grocery store whose cash register sys-
tem could not process credit cards expiring in or after 2000. The
plaintiff asserted claims for breach of warranty, violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, violation of state consumer pro-
tection acts, breach of warranty, breach of duty of good faith,
desist order requiring the advertiser to refrain from making false or misleading
representations about its product or to include qualifying disclosures in its
advertisements. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
37. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis omitted).
38. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcrIcES AcT, § 3, 7A U.L.A. 236
(1985); UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES Ac, § 2, 7A U.L.A. 277 (1985);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997) (defining unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent business acts or practices); § 17500 (West 1997) (prohibiting false
advertising); § 17506 (West 1997) (providing penalties for unfair competition);
§ 17538 (West 1997) (requiring vendors on the Internet, as well as vendors
using traditional telephone, mail, and catalog media, to disclose their return
and refund policies and legal name and address); CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1770(a),
1780(a) (West 1997) (providing cause of action under Consumers Legal
Remedies Act for misrepresentations concerning goods).
39. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th
1372 (1992) (discussing indemnity and contribution); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 875 (West 1980) (providing right of contribution).
40. Produce Palace Int'l v. TEC-Am. Corp., Civ. No. 97-P-20134 (Mich.
Cir. Ct., Macomb Cty., filed July 11, 1997).
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negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The case
was recently resolved for $250,000.
Thereafter, consumers filed several class actions alleging
that software manufacturers should provide free upgrades to sat-
isfy Y2K problems occurring in earlier versions of the software. A
class action filed in California in late 1997 alleged that Software
Business Technologies, Inc.'s (SBT's) accounting software was
defective in not being Y2K compliant, and that SBT was improp-
erly forcing customers to pay for an upgrade to correct the prob-
lem.4 Two other class actions filed in California alleged that
Symantec Corp.'s Norton AntiVirus software prior to version 4.0
is similarly defective, and that consumers should not have to pay
for the 4.0 upgrade in order to have the problem fixed.42 Plain-
tiffs in these cases asserted claims for breach of warranty, fraud,
and negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act and consumer protection statutes.43 Several
other lawsuits assert similar allegations.44
41. Atlaz Int'l Inc. v. Software Bus. Techs., Inc., No. 172539 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
Marin Cty., filed Dec. 3, 1997) (class action for breach of warranty, fraud, unfair
business practices). This action was recently settled, with the defendant
agreeing to provide certain upgrades at no cost.
42. Cameron v. Symantec Corp., No. 772482 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Santa Clara
Cty., filed Mar. 6, 1998) (class action for fraud, breach of implied warranty,
breach of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and
unfair business practices); Cappellan v. Symantec Corp., No. 772147 (Cal. Sup.
Ct., Santa Clara Cty., filed Feb. 19, 1998) (class action for breach of implied
warranty, violations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, fraud, and unfair business
practices).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Courtney v. Medical Manager Corp., No. 98-CV-3347 (D.N.J.,
filedJuly 15, 1998) (class action for breach of warranty and state trade practices
act, alleging that maker of voice-processing system and computer-telephone
integration product should have known system was not Y2K compliant, yet is
charging for upgrades); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics,
Inc., No. 98-1084 (W.D. Pa., filed June 19, 1998) (class action for breach of
contract, breach of warranty, fraud and negligence, alleging that manufacturer
of software knew or should have known software was not designed to process
dates after 2000); Glusker v. Medical Manager Sales & Mktg. Inc., No.
CV775812 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Santa Clara Cty., filed Aug. 3, 1998) (class action for
breach of contract, fraud, unfair business practices, alleging software
manufacturer knew or should have known software was not Y2K compliant, yet
is charging for upgrades); Issokson v. Intuit Inc., CV773646 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
Santa Clara Cty., filed Apr. 29, 1998) (some versions of Quicken are defective
because of inability to process dates after 1999); College v. Medical Manager
Corp., No. 98-6401 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Hillsborough Cty., filed Aug. 25, 1998) (class
action based on breach of warranty and violations of state deceptive trade
practices act, alleging software manufacturer knew or should have known
software was not Y2K compliant, yet is charging for upgrades); H. Levenbaum
Ins. Agency v. Active Voice Corp., No. 98-3864 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty.,
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In addition, shareholders have brought lawsuits asserting
that their companies exaggerated the company's ability to gener-
ate Y2K-related business. For example, a stock purchaser filed a
federal securities class action claiming that an information tech-
nology solutions and services provider made materially false and
misleading statements in a public stock offering about its ability
to obtain Y2K-related business and staffing.45
C. Legislation
Recognizing the severity and imminence of the Y2K prob-
lem, state and federal governments are beginning to enact Y2K-
related legislation. The Year 2000 Information and Readiness
Disclosure Act46 encourages companies to disclose and share
information about Y2K problems by providing limited immunity
for false statements and a limited exemption from antitrust laws.
Specifically, a Y2K readiness disclosure statement is not admissi-
ble against the maker under federal or state law to prove the
accuracy of any Y2K statement in the disclosure, unless it was
made with (1) actual knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading, (2) an intent to deceive or mislead, or (3) reckless
disregard of its accuracy.47 The immunity does not apply to doc-
uments filed with the SEC or banking regulators or written dis-
closures made in connection with the offer or sale of securities.
filed July 28, 1998) (class action for breach of warranty, alleging that maker of
voice-processing system and computer-telephone integration product should
have known system was not Y2K compliant, yet is charging for upgrades);
Against Gravity Apparel, Inc. v. Quarterdeck Corp., No. 603 752-98 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., New York Cty., filed July 30, 1998) (class action, breach of warranty, breach
of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, New York consumer protection laws, alleging
same); Chilelli v. Intuit Inc., No. 98-013559 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., filed
May 13, 1998) (some versions of Quicken are defective because of inability to
process dates after 1999); Paragon Networks Int'l Inc. v. Macola Inc., No. 98-CV-
0119 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Marion Cty., filed Apr. 1, 1998) (class action for breach of
express warranty and fraud; older versions of software product were not able to
process dates after 1999); Women's Inst. for Fertility Endocrinology &
Menopause v. Medical Manager Corp., No. 419 (Pa. C.P. Ct., filed Aug. 3,1998)
(class action for breach of implied warranty, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation and fraud).
45. Steinberg v. PRT Group, Inc., No. 98-Civ-6550 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept.
16, 1998) (asserting claims under §§ 11, 12 & 15 of the Securities Act of 1933).
46. Pub. L. No. 105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (1998). A California law signed
on September 24, 1998, also provides limited liability immunity for companies
that voluntarily share information to resolve Y2K problems. See Cal. Legis. Serv.
ch. 860 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3269-71).
47. See Pub. L. No. 105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (1998).
48. See id.
1999]
144 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
Other legislation, designed to limit liability for Y2K losses, is
sure to follow. In light of the anticipated flood of Y2K litigation,
California legislators last year introduced several bills attempting
to limit liability in Y2K litigation. Although none of these bills
survived in committee, they reflect a variety of approaches to the
problem.
Assembly Bill (AB) 17104" provided that the exclusive remedy
in any lawsuit (except lawsuits for personal injury) resulting
directly or indirectly from a Y2K computer date failure would be
"deemed to be based solely in contract." Limiting available relief
to contract remedies would reduce the potential recovery and
thus reduce the attractiveness of bringing Y2K litigation.5" Com-
puter or software designers or manufacturers would receive the
benefit of this limitation of remedies only if they gave notice of a
potential date failure and offered a free replacement or repair.
Thus, computer and software companies would have an incentive
to disclose potential date failures and offer free fixes, particularly
since the notice could not be used to prove that the company
breached a contract or otherwise acted culpably.
As written, however, AB 1710 probably would not have
curbed much litigation. Statutes that award plaintiffs recovery
for their attorneys' fees in cases enforcing important rights affect-
ing the public interest provide incentive for plaintiffs and their
counsel to pursue such litigation.51 AB 1710 would probably not
have precluded the recovery of attorneys' fees, leaving the incen-
tive for litigation. Interestingly, AB 1710 would not have discour-
aged the Y2K class actions to date, as the defendants apparently
had not provided notice of potential computer date failure or
offered a free Y2K fix. Furthermore, because AB 1710 did not
49. A.B. 1710, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), also available at <http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/billinfo.html>.
50. Damages for breach of contract are intended to put the injured party
in as good a position as if the contract had been performed, and usually are
limited to the harm reasonably contemplated by the parties when they signed
the contract. By comparison, damages for torts, such as negligence or fraud,
could include damages that the parties had not anticipated. See CAL. Clv. CODE
§ 3333 (West 1997). Consequential damages, such as lost profits, are therefore
more difficult to recover in contract actions. Thus, a company or consumer
that receives non-compliant Y2K products could sue the manufacturer for the
costs of solving the problem, but might not recover for the business it lost due
to the non-compliant product, or for the liability the company or consumer
incurred to others. In addition, contract remedies usually do not include
compensation for emotional distress. Nor do contract remedies include
punitive damages, which might be imposed in other cases to punish the
defendant for acting with malice or fraud. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West
1997).
51. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
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clearly identify the "exclusive remedies," plaintiffs would have
tested the language and sought more extensive remedies until
the courts ruled clearly to the contrary.
California AB 193452 proposed to limit, in any action based
on computer date failure, the recovery for non-economic losses
to $250,000. Because the bill would have limited only non-eco-
nomic losses, it would not have curbed business litigation. Fur-
thermore, nothing in the legislation demonstrated that the
availability of $250,000 for non-economic damages would dis-
courage litigation.
While AB 1934 may have been too limited, California SB
200053 would have been overbroad. SB 2000 would have pro-
vided immunity to public entities and their employees from any
cause of action based on an incorrect date they "produced, calcu-
lated or generated," "regardless of the cause of the error."
Although the bill by its terms would not have affected liability
based on breach of contract, the legislation would have appar-
ently immunized public entities from damages for all date errors,
even if not caused by Y2K problems.
D. Conclusion
Predictions of the effect of the Y2K problem range from
minor inconvenience to the catastrophic collapse of world econ-
omies and massive personal injuries from failing equipment.
Whatever the Y2K effect, litigation will surely arise in the absence
of legislation that effectively discourages lawsuits. Most of the
Y2K problems will derive from decades-old legacy systems, but
litigation will be least effective against the parties responsible for
those systems because Y2K was not an issue at the time. Corpo-
rate officers and directors must therefore be vigilant in taking
prompt steps to assess company systems, remediate Y2K
problems, test to assure Y2K compliance, investigate the compli-
ance of vendors, and develop contingency plans.
II. THE INTERNET
In 1969, the Department of Defense commissioned the
development of a decentralized national communications net-
work that would withstand a nuclear attack. The experimental
network, called ARPANET, was designed so that if any hub in the
network was destroyed, messages would be rerouted automati-
52. A.B. 1934, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), also available at <http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/billinfo.html>.
53. S.B. 2000, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), also available at <http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/billinfo.html>.
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cally through an alternative hub. ARPANET evolved into today's
Internet, a comprehensive network of thousands of computer
networks throughout the world.
The most popular segment of the Internet is the World
Wide Web, which consists of thousands of multimedia Web pages
that include text, graphics, sounds, and other files.5 4 These Web
pages reside on host computers, or servers, which are located all
over the world and communicate with each other according to a
"hypertext protocol" ("HTTP"). Other segments of the Internet
include electronic mail ("e-mail"), Bulletin Board Services
("BBS"), 5 and UseNet newsgroups.5 6
Users gain access to the Internet using an online service,
such as America Online or Microsoft Network, or an Internet
Service Provider ("ISP"). Although the distinction between
online services and ISPs is beginning to blur, as a general matter
online services, unlike ISPs, offer third-party content and interac-
tive services such as e-mail, "chat" rooms, bulletin boards, home
pages, and directories. Most users connect to the online service
or ISP using their computer modem and a standard telephone
line or special high speed connection.5 7
Users navigate the Web with the help of "browser" software,
which provide a graphic interface to the Web. A user who wants
to visit a particular Web site types into the browser the desired
site's address or Uniform Resource Locator ("URL"), often
known as a "domain name."5" A domain name takes the form of
54. Forming the basis for the Web is the programming language called
"hypertext markup language" ("HTML"), which converts text into multi-media.
See G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 148 (1995).
55. Bulletin board services are computer systems that enable users to post
messages on an electronic "billboard," upload and download files, and
participate in electronic discussions, often called "chats." See id. at 19.
56. The UseNet, short for User's Network, is a network of computers
distributing "newsgroup" information. Newsgroups are discussion groups
dedicated to a particular topic. See HARLE HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERNET
COMPLETE REFERENCE 22-23 (1994).
57. When uploading information onto the Web, the user's modem
changes the computer's digital data into analog form for transmission over
analog telephone lines to the service provider. The modem at that end then
changes the analog data back into digital form and passes it on to its ultimate
destination in cyberspace, often by way of one or more switches or routers.
Downloading information from the Web takes the reverse course. See id. at 36.
ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) service transfers data in its original
digital format, improving the speed of transmission. See ALLISON, supra note 54,
at 334. Faster still is TI service, which runs from the customer to the central
communications office of an ISP. See id. at 338.
58. Each Web site actually has two addresses: (1) a numerical IP (Internet
Protocol) address, comprised of four groups of numbers separated by decimals,
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letters and numbers, such as "http://www.orrick.com. '' 59 If the
user does not know the site's address, the user may search for the
site, or for other sites on the same subject, by accessing a site
called a search engine or online directory and typing in words
that describe the desired site.
Users may also "surf'-moving from site to site-by means
of hyperlinks, which appear on a Web page as words in a differ-
ent color or other differentiated text or image. When a user
clicks the computer's mouse on a hyperlink, the user is con-
nected to another Web page, which may be part of the same site
or part of a different site.6"
The Internet has grown dramatically in the last few years. In
1994, three million people, most of them in the United States,
used the Internet.6 1 In 1998, 100 million people from around
the world used the Internet.6 2 It is estimated that one billion
people may be connected to the Internet by 2005,63
The Internet provides unparalleled opportunities for com-
munication, education, entertainment, and commerce, crossing
international boundaries in a split second at a fraction of the cost
which identifies the site's host computer; and (2) for the convenience of users,
a unique Uniform Resource Locator, commonly called a "domain name." See
HAHN & STOUT, supra note 56, at 49, 57. Specialized computers known as
"domain name servers" maintain tables linking domain names to IP numbers.
See DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 75-76 (1994). See also
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 952 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
59. In this example, "http" refers to the hypertext protocol, and "www"
refers to the World Wide Web. See ALLISON, supra note 54, at 334. The actual
domain name is "orrick.com." The word "orrick" is the "second level" domain,
which is chosen by the owner of the site to identify the site's content or owner.
The abbreviation "com" is the "top level" domain, which identifies the owner as
a commercial entity. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 56, at 53.
60. A similar means of moving from site to site is a "button bar." A
button bar is a row of pictures, called icons. When a user clicks on the icon, the
user is linked to another part of the site or a different site.
61. See MARY MEEKER & SHARON PEARSON, MORGAN STANLE U.S.
INVESTMENT RESEARCH: INTERNET RETAIL (May 28, 1997) cited in SECRETARIAT ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL
ECONOMY 7 (1998).
62. See id. This growth rate has surpassed earlier predictions. See also
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("An
estimated 30 million people worldwide use the Internet with 100 million
predicted to be on the 'net' in a matter of years."); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd., 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (reporting 40 million
users in 1996 and estimates of 200 million users by 1999).
63. See SECRETARIAT ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 61, at 7. By
2002, the Internet may be used for more than $300 billion worth of commerce.
See id.
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of traditional media. Colleagues in different parts of the world
can share and edit documents simultaneously, and have conver-
sations online in real time. There is, however, no center or com-
mand station for cyberspace. Nor is there any uniform set of laws
or central source of governance. To the contrary, the Internet
has been developed largely by entrepreneurs and visionaries who
relish the blossoming of cyberspace without the interference of
government regulation.64
Technological differences between cyberspace and the
"brick and mortar" world of traditional jurisprudence, as well as
the philosophical differences between the frontier of cyberspace
and regulations designed to protect property rights, combine to
create new and as yet unresolved legal issues. While by no means
an exhaustive list, the primary issues may be divided into four
categories: (1) personal jurisdiction; (2) domain names; (3) Web
site content; and (4) electronic commerce, including online con-
tracting and privacy.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
For a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, both
constitutional due process requirements and any applicable state
64. In 1990, Mitchell Kapor and John Perry Barlow, founders of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, described the early nature of the Internet as
follows:
In its present condition, Cyberspace is a frontier region,
populated by the few hardy technologists who can tolerate the
austerity of its savage computer interfaces, incompatible
communications protocols, proprietary barricades, cultural and legal
ambiguities, and general lack of useful maps or metaphors.
Certainly, the old concepts of property, expression, identity,
movement, and context, based as they are on physical manifestations,
do not apply succinctly in a world where there can be none. [ ]
Sovereignty over this new world is also not well defined....
Our financial, legal, and even physical lives are increasingly
dependent on realities of which we have only the dimmest awareness.
We have entrusted the basic functions of modern existence to
institutions we cannot name, using tools we've never heard of and
could not operate if we had.
As communications and data technology continues to change and
develop at a pace many times that of society, the inevitable conflicts
have begun to occur on the border between Cyberspace and the
physical world.
MITCHELL KAPOR & JOHN PERRY BARLow, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
ACROSS THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1990), quoted in ROBERT B. GELMAN & STAN-
TON McLANDISH, PROTECTING YOURSELF ONLINE 13-14 (1998) (alteration in
original).
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"long arm" statute must be satisfied.65 Under the Constitution, a
defendant in one state may be subject to litigation in another
state if the defendant has "minimum contacts" with that other
state, such that the maintenance of jurisdiction does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."66 Some
state statutes employ this same standard,67 while others are more
restrictive.68
A non-resident defendant may be subject to "general" juris-
diction or "specific" jurisdiction. General jurisdiction arises if
the defendant conducts "continuous and systematic" activities in
the state, and permits litigation against the defendant for any
cause of action, whether or not the cause of action is related to
the defendant's activities in the state.69 Specific jurisdiction may
arise if the defendant had one or more contacts with the state,
but permits lawsuits against the defendant only for causes of
action arising out of those contacts.7w Specific jurisdiction exists
if the defendant actually committed a tort within the state, or if
the defendant's out-of-state activities were purposefully directly
toward a state resident and caused injury.
7 1
In deciding whether the exercise of general and specific
jurisdiction will "comport with fair play and substantial justice, '"72
considerations include the extent of the defendant's purposeful
activities in the forum, the burden on the defendant, the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest
65. See Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.
1974) (starting point in analysis of personal jurisdiction in federal court is long
arm statute of state in which the federal court is located).
66. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);
Von's Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Cal. 1996).
67. See, e.g., CAL. Cfv. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1998).
68. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1997).
69. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
415-16 (1984); Von's, 926 P.2d at 1092.
70. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Von's,
926 P.2d at 1092.
71. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90
(1984). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine whether a
non-resident defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction: (1) the defendant
must perform an act or transaction within the forum or purposefully avail
himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum; (2) the claim must arise
out of the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise ofjurisdiction
must be reasonable. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th
Cir. 1997).
72. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
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in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the existence of
an alternative forum.
7 3
1. General Jurisdiction Based on Web Site
Conceivably, a Web site could create such continuous and
systematic contacts with a state that it would establish general
jurisdiction, especially if the site generated substantial sales.74
Courts have held in more traditional contexts, however, that
merely placing advertisements or toll-free numbers in nationally
distributed periodicals does not subject a non-resident to general
71jurisdiction. Communicating regularly with Californians on a
national computer-based information service has been held not
to establish general jurisdiction. 76 Furthermore, even if the Web
is akin to a telephone system by which users communicate with
one another, most courts hold that merely making telephone
calls to residents of another state is insufficient in itself to confer
general jurisdiction.77
2. Specific Jurisdiction for Claims Arising out of Web Site
A Web site is more likely to give rise to specific jurisdiction,
where statements on the Web site are the basis for the plaintiffs
causes of action. For example, the Web site itself may give rise to
claims such as breach of contract, false advertising, or trademark
or copyright infringement. Under a constitutional analysis, the
issue is usually whether the defendant purposefully availed itself
of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state.
Under state long arm statutes, the issue is whether the defend-
ant's activities fall within the provisions of the statute.
73. See id. at 476-77. This article focuses on the purposeful availment
aspect of specific jurisdiction. The "reasonableness" of the exercise of
jurisdiction is well discussed in Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1322-24 (9th Cir. 1998).
74. Cf Sollinger v. Nasco Int'l, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (D. Vt. 1987)
(holding that federal district court in Vermont had personal jurisdiction over
Wisconsin defendant who mailed catalogs into Vermont to solicit business and
conducted business over telephone with Vermont residents). But see
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (holding that mere creation of Web site does not give
rise to general jurisdiction).
75. See Federal Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d
1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1994); cf. Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.
1984) (listing in phone directory without further solicitation is not enough in
itself to confer personal jurisdiction).
76. See California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp.
1356, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
77. See, e.g., Far West Capital Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 (10th Cir.
1995).
EMERGING ISSUES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND CYBERSPACE
a. Decisions Under Constitutional Due Process
Whether a defendant, through its Web site, purposefully
availed itself of the benefits of the forum state turns on "the
nature and quality of commercial activity that [the] entity con-
ducts over the Internet."7 8 It is not required that the defendant
be physically present or have physical contact with the forum, so
long as its actions were "purposefully directed" at residents of the
forum.
7 9
In asserting specific jurisdiction over claims arising out of a
Web site's content, courts have relied in part on features of the
Internet that distinguish it from traditional media. In Maritz, Inc.
v. Cybergold, Inc.,8 0 the court suggested that Web site advertising
more likely amounts to purposeful availment than advertising by
direct mail or an "800" telephone number, noting the "different
nature" of electronic communications. In EDIAS Software Interna-
tional, L.L.C. v. BASIS International Ltd.," l the court exercised
jurisdiction over a nonresident software producer for defamatory
Web site postings and e-mail messages, explaining that informa-
tion on a Web site is more accessible than traditional advertising.
In exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident who advertised on
the Internet, the court in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.1
2
suggested that Web site advertising may more likely constitute
purposeful availment than other advertisements because "adver-
tisements over the Internet are available to Internet users contin-
ually, at the stroke of a few keys of a computer. '83
The primary consideration in determining if a Web site con-
stitutes purposeful availment has been whether the site is "inter-
active," rather than a "passive" display akin to traditional
advertisements and solicitations. In Maritz, the Web site was
deemed "active" because it encouraged users to add their names
to a mailing list, even though the business of the Web site itself
was not yet operational. In EDIAS, an electronic bulletin board
78. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997)); accord Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th
Cir. 1998).
79. For certain tort claims, purposeful availment may be demonstrated
under a so-called "effects test" by (1) intentional actions, (2) expressly aimed at
the forum state, (3) causing harm in the forum state, where the defendant
knows harm will likely be suffered in the forum state. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 786;
Panavision, 141 F.3d at. 1321; Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d
1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
80. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
81. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
82. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
83. Id. at 163.
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on which defamatory e-mail messages appeared was deemed
interactive, because it allowed the Web page owner or visitor to
post as well as read messages.
The distinction between interactive and passive sites was well
chronicled by the Ninth Circuit in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.84
In Cybersell, an Arizona corporation provided Internet advertis-
ing, marketing, and consulting services under the service mark
Cybersell. A Florida company of the same name provided Web
site construction services and maintained a Web site "cyb-
sell.com." Plaintiff filed suit in Arizona, alleging that the Florida
company infringed its service mark. The Florida company had
not used its site to conduct commercial activity, such as inviting
residents to subscribe to a service or accepting money from Ari-
zona residents. Characterizing the site as essentially passive, the
court ruled that the mere fact that the site could be accessed
anywhere did not give rise to an inference that the defendant
had deliberately directed its marketing toward Arizona. The
defendant's posting of the site was therefore insufficient to con-
stitute purposeful availment.8 5
If a Web site is not interactive, it may still give rise to jurisdic-
tion if the owner conducted additional activities in the forum.
For example, in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,
8 6
the court exercised jurisdiction over a California defendant who
not only advertised on the Internet, but also sold subscriptions to
3,000 state residents and entered into contracts with Internet ser-
vice providers in the state to download the electronic messages
which formed the basis of the suit. 7
84. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. See id. at 419-20. The court explained that the "effects" test set forth in
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) and Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries, 11 F.3d
1482 (9th Cir. 1993), did not apply. That test permits jurisdiction with respect
to intentional torts directed at the plaintiff, causing injury where the plaintiff
lives. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789; Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486. The court reasoned
that the effects test was inapplicable because the plaintiff was a corporation,
rather than an individual, and a corporation "does not suffer harm in a
particular geographic location in the same sense that an individual does."
Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420; Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322
n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
86. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
87. See also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316 (holding that specific jurisdiction
existed over defendant who purposefully registered plaintiffs trademarks as
domain names to force plaintiff to pay defendant money, where the brunt of
harm to plaintiff was in California and defendant knew plaintiff would suffer
harm in California); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that entry into contract governed by Ohio law and electronically
transmitting files to Ohio database gave rise to jurisdiction). But see SF Hotel
Co. L.P. v. Energy Invs., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that
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In summary, the nature and extent of a Web site's interac-
tions with residents of another state, and possibly the extent to
which the company conducts related activities in the state, will
determine whether the company has purposefully availed itself of
the benefits of the forum. Provided that the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion is otherwise reasonable, such purposeful availment will sat-
isfy constitutional due process requirements for personal
jurisdiction with respect to claims arising out of those contacts.88
b. Decisions Under State Law
Even if a Web site or e-mail reflects purposeful availment
and satisfies the constitutional due process requirements for per-
sonal jurisdiction, jurisdiction may not be exercised unless the
requirements of the forum state's long arm statute are also met.
Some state laws, for example, require physical presence of
the defendant or other requirements not necessary for due pro-
cess. In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,89 a Missouri defendant
maintained a Web site promoting a jazz club called "The Blue
Note." The use of the name allegedly infringed the trademark of
the plaintiff, who operated a jazz club of the same name in New
York. Initially, the site included a hyperlink to the plaintiff's own
Web site. After the plaintiff objected, the defendant changed the
Web site and disclaimed affiliation with the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff brought suit in federal court in New York, asserting thatjuris-
diction existed under two provisions of the New York long arm
statute: C.P.L.R. 302(a) (2), for tortious acts committed within
the state, and C.P.L.R. 302(a) (3), for out-of-state activities caus-
ing injury within the state, where the defendant derived substan-
tial revenues from interstate commerce. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Missouri resident's Web site,
although accessed in New York, did not give rise to jurisdiction
under New York's long arm statute. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (2) did not
grant jurisdiction because the defendant's creation of the site,
use of the words Blue Note and the Blue Note logo, and creation
of the hyperlink were performed by persons physically in Mis-
souri, not New York. There was no jurisdiction under C.P.L.R.
Florida defendant was not subject to general jurisdiction in federal district
court in Kansas, even though defendant maintained passive advertisement on
Internet).
88. See also Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that defendant did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits
and protections of Indiana law where his only contact with Indiana was his Web
site that asked if anyone knew of fraud or unfair treatment caused by the
Indiana company's subsidiary).
89. 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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302(a) (3) because the defendant did not have substantial reve-
nues derived from interstate commerce.
90
Other states do not condition jurisdiction on the physical
presence of the defendants. In Hall v. LaRonde,91 a California
plaintiff had entered into a contract with a New York business
that would license the plaintiffs software to the public and for-
ward royalties to the plaintiff. The parties negotiated the con-
tract via e-mail and telephone from their respective states. When
a dispute arose, the plaintiff sued in California. The court, not-
ing that California's long arm statute permitted exercise of juris-
diction coextensive with constitutional due process
requirements, held that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction
even though he was never physically in California. Citing the
changing "role that electronic communications plays in business
transactions," the court concluded that "[t] here is no reason why
the requisite minimum contacts cannot be electronic."
9 2
In Telco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple a Day, Inc.,93 a
Missouri corporation posted defamatory press releases about the
Virginia plaintiff. Plaintiff sued in federal court in Virginia. Vir-
ginia's long arm statute permits the exercise ofjurisdiction over a
defendant who causes injury within the state if, among other
things, the defendant regularly conducts business in the state.
The court found that the defendant met this standard by posting
two or three press releases which advertised its firm and solicited
investment banking assistance, and which Virginia residents
90. See id. at 28-29; cf Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2065 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (holding that no jurisdiction existed under N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) because defendant, who created a Web site merely
announcing a future business, was not present within the state).
91. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 402. The defendant relied on Interdyne Co. v. SYS Computer
Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 508 (1973), which held that a California resident who
deals with nonresident purchasers only through out-of-state agents or interstate
mail and telephone cannot compel the nonresident to come to California for
litigation. The court in Hall disagreed with the Interdyne decision, concluding
that jurisdiction should not be determined by whether the defendant's
communications were made in person, particularly in light of the expansion of
commerce in the electronic age. The court stated:
Much has happened in the role that electronic communications
plays in business transactions since Interdyne was decided more than
20 years ago. The speed and ease of communications has increased
the number of transactions that are consummated without either party
leaving the office. There is no reason why the requisite minimum
contacts cannot be electronic.
Hall, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 402.
93. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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could access twenty-four hours a day.94 The court distinguished
the Second Circuit's holding in Bensusan, because, unlike
New York's long arm statute, Virginia's long arm statute does not
predicate jurisdiction on the defendant being physically present
in the state.95
3. Conclusion
In general, the more interactive a Web site is, the more
likely it will give rise to jurisdiction. As in EDIAS and Maritz, invit-
ing consumers to sign on for services, post messages, and order
products from a Web site will increase the chances that a court
will find purposeful availment.
The irony, of course, is that interactivity is what sets the
Internet medium apart from other media. Companies may
therefore attempt to limit their vulnerability to jurisdiction in dis-
tant forums by other means, without unduly compromising inter-
activity. First, the site could limit the ability of residents in
distant states to access the site. By requiring users to identify
their state or zip code, it may be possible to preclude access to
the site in certain states, or preclude on-line orders from resi-
dents of those states. Second, the site may expressly state that it
is for the benefit of residents of the company's home state only,
disclaiming any intent of purposeful availment. Third, the site
may dictate that litigation arising out of transactions or commu-
nications with the site must be brought in a particular court.
96
These tactics have not yet been tested in a reported decision, but
may help companies reconcile the attributes of Internet technol-
ogy with the law of personal jurisdiction.9 7
94. See id. at 406.
95. See id.
96. Under federal law, forum selection clauses are generally presumed
valid and will be enforced unless unfair, unreasonable, or induced by fraud, or
the other party did not receive at least constructive notice of the selection. See
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Schutte, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991); Burger King
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985). A forum selection clause has been
enforced even where the parties did not have any other contacts within the
forum. See Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team, GMBH, 757 F. Supp. 1062,
1069 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
97. As the United States Supreme Court articulated decades ago: "As
technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between the states,
the need for jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase." Hanson v. Denkla,
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
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B. Domain Name Disputes
As discussed above, Web sites are identified by domain
names.9" Domain names consist of (1) a second level domain-
the word(s) located to the left of the "dot"-which is often the
name of the site owner, and (2) a top level domain-the abbrevi-
ation to the right of the "dot"-that identifies the type of entity
owning the site. Currently, the Web is "divided" into top level
domains of ".com" for commercial or other entities or individu-
als, ".net" for networks, ".edu" for educational institutions, ".gov"
for government entities, and ".org" for non-profit organiza-
tions.99
Domain names are currently registered by the Internet Net-
work Information Center ("InterNIC"), which operates in the
United States through a company called Network Solutions, Inc.
("NSI").' 00 NSI does not make any independent determination
of an applicant's right to use a domain name. 10 1 Instead, it regis-
ters domain names on a "first come, first served" basis and
screens domain name applications against its registry to prevent
repeat registrations of the same name. 102 Although NSI has a
"domain name dispute policy,"103 disputes involving the assertion
of trademark rights usually resort to the courts.
Most businesses on the Internet like to have second level
domain names that include the name of their company because
many Web users attempt to find a company on the Web by typing
in the name of the company (e.g. Pepsi) in the form of a domain
name (i.e. "pepsi.com"). The nature of Web technology further
increases the incentive of companies to use a particular domain
98. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
99. There are also top level domains that are two-letter country codes.
100. The domain name registration system is currently in transition. By
now, the ".com" top level domain has become quite crowded, inspiring
thoughts of adding new generic top level domains ("gTLDs"). At the same
time, the administration of the system is changing hands. Pursuant to aJune 5,
1998 White Paper entitled "Management of Internet Names and Addresses"
issued by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
domain name registration and new top level domains are under the direction
of a new U.S. non-profit corporation, The Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), with an international board of directors. NSI
presently registers top level domains, but will have to open its registration
system to competitors in the spring of 1999.
101. See Network Solutions, Inc., 1998 Domain Name Dispute Policy 1
(Feb. 25, 1998) <http://www.netsol.com/rs/dispute-policy.html>.
102. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
103. The latest version of this dispute policy can be obtained at the NSI
Web site located at <http://www.netsol.com/rs/dispute-policy.html>.
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name. Under traditional trademark infringement laws, usually
more than one company may use the same or similar name pro-
vided the companies' respective industries or geographic loca-
tions are sufficiently dissimilar that consumers will not be
confused as to the source of the goods or services.104 The prob-
lem created by the Internet, however, is that "[s]econd level
domain names, the name just to the left of '.com,' must be exclu-
sive."105 Because only one person or entity can maintain a given
domain name, the right to maintain the name is extremely
important.
Disputes over the right to use a particular domain name are
usually based on theories of trademark infringement or trade-
mark dilution under the federal Lanham Act. Trademark
infringement exists if: (1) the plaintiff has a federally registered
mark; (2) the accused infringer uses the mark "in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any
goods or services"; and (3) the use is likely to cause confusion,
mistake, or deception.106 Trademark dilution exists if: (1) the
plaintiff owns a "famous" mark; (2) the accused makes a "com-
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name"; (3) the
accused's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the
use dilutes the mark by tarnishing it or blurring its
distinctiveness.
0 7
Defendants in domain name disputes tend to fall into one of
five categories: (1) cybersquatters, who intentionally register
domain names using names similar to a trademark of another
company, and then sell the rights to the domain name to the
owner of the mark; (2) non-trademark holders disparaging a
company through use of its trademark; (3) non-trademark hold-
104. A commonly cited example is Delta Faucets and Delta Airlines. Both
may use the name Delta in commerce, but only one may have the domain name
"delta.com."
105. Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 953.
106. See McCARTHY, supra note 34, § 25:76, at 25-143 (citing Lanham Act
§ 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1) (1994)). Infringement of an unregistered mark
may also be actionable under the Lanham Act. The plaintiff must show: (1) a
valid protectable mark (i.e. distinctive or suggestive with a secondary meaning
and used before defendant used it); (2) the accused infringer's use is "on or in
connection with any goods or services"; and (3) the use is likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deception as to the affiliation, connection or association
of the accused infringer or as to the origin of the "goods, services or
commercial activities" of the accused infringer. Id. (citing Lanham Act
§ 43(a) (1) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (A) (1994)). At least one court has held
that infringement does not arise from the use of another's trademark in a non-
domain portion of the Web site address. See Patmont Motor Werks, Inc., v.
Gateway Marine, Inc., No. 96-2703, 1997 WL 811770 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997).
107. Id. (citing Lanham Act, § 43(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)).
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ers capitalizing on a company's trademark; (4) innocent users;
and (5) concurrent trademark holders.
1. Cybersquatters
Cybersquatters register a domain name that is the same or
nearly identical to the name of a well-known company. This
registration precludes the trademark holder from registering a
domain name using its own trademarked company name. Fur-
thermore, it means that a Web site sporting the company's name
may include material that would affect the company's reputation
or goodwill. Generally, the trademark holder will attempt to pro-
cure the right to the domain name from the registrant, and the
registrant will demand a fee. Cybersquatters will often repeat
this process for dozens of domain names and trademark holders.
Cybersquatters are typically sued for trademark dilution. 1°8
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,' °9 the plaintiff held
registered trademarks to the name "Panavision" in connection
with motion picture camera equipment.1 When plaintiff
attempted to register the domain name "Panavision.com" with
NSI," a it found that the domain name was registered to defend-
ant Toeppen, who was using the name to refer to a Web site dis-
playing photos of the City of Pana, Illinois.' 12 When Toeppen
was told to cease using the mark, Toeppen offered to turn over
the domain name for payment of $13,000.11' Panavision refused
and sued Toeppen for dilution of its trademark under the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act of 19951" and its California
108. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998);
see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998);
McGraw v. Salmon, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10987 (C.D. Cal.June 30, 1998); Toys
'R' Us, Inc. v. Abir, No. 97 Civ. 8673, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 1997).
109. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).




114. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994). The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
provides in part:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark ....
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
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equivalent." 5 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Panavision on both claims." 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's rul-
ing.'" 7 Toeppen did not contest that the Panavision mark was
famous or that his use of the mark began after it became famous.
Instead, Toeppen contended that the mere registration of a
trademark as a domain name, without more, is not a commercial
use. 18 The court rejected Toeppen's argument, finding that
Toeppen was in fact engaged in the "business" of registering
trademarks as domain names with the intent to later profit by
selling them to the rightful trademark owner. 1 '9
Furthermore, the court found that Toeppen's actions
amounted to dilution120 because the site "diminished 'the capac-
ity of Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's
goods and services on the Internet. '"" 21 The court explained
that "[a] significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the
entity that owns the [W]ebsite,' 22 and Toeppen's use of "Panavi-
sion.com" would lead those searching for the Panavision site to
discover Toeppen's site and be discouraged from wading
115. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319; California Anti-dilution statute, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1998). The California statute prohibits
the dilution of "the distinctive quality" of a mark regardless of competition or
likelihood of confusion. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324.
116. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1318. During the litigation, it was
discovered that Mr. Toeppen had registered domain names for at least 100
other companies including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, and
Lufthansa. He had also attempted to sell at least two other domain names for
between $10,000 and $15,000. See id. at 1319.
117. See id. at 1327.
118. See id. at 1324.
119. See id. at 1319. The court noted that "[i]t does not matter that he
did not attach the marks to a product. Toeppen's commercial use was his
attempt to sell the trademarks themselves. Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act and the California Anti-dilution statute, this was sufficient
commercial use." Id. at 1325-26 (citation omitted).
120. Dilution usually involves "blurring" or "tarnishment." Blurring
occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiffs trademark to identify the defendant's
goods or services, creating the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to
serve as a unique identifier of plaintiff's product. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey, Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d.
Cir. 1994)). Tarnishment occurs when a famous mark is improperly associated
with an inferior or offensive product or service. See McCarthy, supra note 34,
§ 24:104.
121. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327 (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
122. Id. (citation omitted).
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through hundreds of other Web sites to find the true Panavision
site. 123
In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,1 24 defendants had regis-
tered over 12,000 domain names under common or trademarked
company names. Defendants argued that they had registered the
names, not for the purpose of selling them to corporations, but
rather to rent them to Internet users as e-mail addresses.
1 25
Skeptical of defendants' assertions, the court found that defend-
ants had nevertheless denied plaintiff the use of its mark as a
domain name and had thus diluted plaintiff's ability to identify
its goods and services.
126
2. Non-Trademark Holder Disparaging a Company
Some register a domain name using the trademarked name
of a company in order to lure users who believe they have
accessed the company's actual site. They then have the opportu-
nity to disparage the company to those most interested in it.
Competitors may employ this tactic. In Green Products Co. v.
Independence Corn By-Products Co., 1 27 defendant Independence
Corn By-Products Co. ("ICBP") registered the domain name
"greenproducts.com" after its competitor, plaintiff Green Prod-
ucts Company ("Green Products"). Green Products sued ICBP
for trademark infringement and sought a preliminary injunction
forcing ICBP to turn over the domain name.12 The court held
that ICBP's use of the domain name created consumer confu-
sion, noting that "ICBP is capitalizing on the strong similarity
between Green Products' trademark and ICBP's domain name to
123. Other federal district courts reached the same result with respect to
Mr. Toeppen. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (enjoining defendant from use of domain name "intermaticcom"). See
also American Standard, Inc. v. Toeppen, No. 96-2147, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144451 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996) (defendant consented to preliminary injunction
on his use of the domain name "americanstandard.com").
124. 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
125. See id. at 1338.
126. See id. at 1340-41. The legislative history of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act also indicates that "cyber-piracy" amounts to trademark dilution.
Senator Patrick Leahy stated, "It is my hope that this antidilution statute can
help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are
choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of
others." 141 CONG. REc. S. 19312-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Leahy).
127. 992 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
128. See id. at 1072-73.
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lure customers onto its [W]eb page." 29 The court issued the
injunction.13 °
The tactic has also been used by those wanting to advocate
views contrary to those of the trademark owner. In Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, T ' the host of a daily
"Catholic Radio" broadcast registered the domain name
"www.plannedparenthood.com" for a Web site which stated,
"Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE!"
Not only was the site unauthorized by Planned Parenthood, it
contained advertising for an anti-abortion book called The Cost of
Abortion. Plaintiff sued defendant for trademark infringement
and trademark dilution.13 2 The court found that defendant's use
of the domain name was a commercial use, because the defend-
ant was promoting his book, soliciting funds for political activi-
ties, and attempting to harm the plaintiff commercially.1 3 3 The
court also concluded that defendant's use of plaintiffs name
both diluted plaintiffs famous mark and presented a significant
likelihood of confusion. The court issued the preliminary
injunction.
In Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky,134 the defendant registered 'Jews-
for-jesus.com" and 'jews-for-jesus.org" as "bogus" Web sites
designed to intercept potential converts through use of "deceit
and trickery."13 5 The court found that defendant's use of plain-
tiffs mark and organization name was deceptive and confusing,
and enjoined the defendant accordingly.
1 3 6
3. Non-Trademark Holder Capitalizing on a
Company's Trademark
Many individuals or companies register domain names simi-
lar or identical to the trademarked names of other companies,
seeking to capitalize on the company's good name and reputa-
tion. The accused infringer solicits business from Internet users
129. See id. at 1076.
130. See id. at 1082.
131. No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
1997).
132. See id. at *4.
133. See id. at *16.
134. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998).
135. Id. at 286, 304.
136. The court rejected the proposition that the domain name was
constitutionally protected free speech under the First Amendment, stating that
"the content of the speech of the defendant [was] not at issue" and that the
defendant was free to publish on a site that did not infringe on the plaintiff's
mark. Id. at 287 n.1, 312.
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who access the site believing it is sponsored by the trademark
holder.
In Cardservice International, Inc. v. McGee,'37 plaintiff owned a
registered trademark on the name "Cardservice International."
Defendant thereafter registered "cardservice.com" as a domain
name. The defendant provided services similar to those of the
plaintiff, but on a much smaller scale.' The court found "a like-
lihood of confusion between Cardservice International's regis-
tered mark and McGee's use of 'cardservice.com,"' because
customers visiting defendant's site were likely to assume that it
belonged to plaintiff due to the similarity of the services offered
by the parties.13 9 The court issued a permanent injunction. 4 °
In Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui,"" plaintiff sought to enjoin
defendant's use of "any colorable variation" on its "Toys 'R' Us"
trademark. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's operation of a
Web site under the name "Adults 'R' Us" infringed and diluted
its mark. The court found that "[b]ecause of Plaintiffs promo-
tional activity and because of the mark's inherent peculiarity, the
'R Us' family of marks have acquired a strong degree of distinc-
tiveness." '142 The court ruled that defendant's use of "Adults 'R'
Us" tarnished plaintiffs mark by associating it with a line of sex-
ual products inconsistent with the image Toys 'R' Us had "striven
to maintain." 43 The court enjoined defendant from using any
Internet domain name ending in "R Us."
4. Non-Trademark Holder Innocently Using a
Company's Trademark
Another increasingly common domain name dispute occurs
when a legitimate business innocently chooses a domain name
that turns out to be trademarked by another company. The reg-
istrant may choose the domain name for business purposes, una-
ware of the superior trademark rights of another company, and
thereafter invest considerable time and energy into developing
and publicizing the Web site and its domain name.
137. 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997).
138. See id. at 738.
139. Id. at 740-41.
140. See id. at 737. See also Lozano Enters. v. La Opinion Publ'g Co.,
No. CV-96-5969, 1997 WL 745036 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 1997).
141. No. C 96-3381, 1996 WL 772709 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996).
142. Id. at *6. See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, No.
96-6961, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17282 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1998); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10559 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 2, 1998).
143. Toys 'R' Us, No. C 96-3381, 1996 WL 772709 at *7.
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The registrant's lack of guile is unlikely to insulate him from
strict enforcement of the trademark laws. In TeleTech Customer
Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co.,1 4 4 defendant had a regis-
tered domain name "teletech.com." Plaintiff had been using the
mark "TeleTech" long before defendant's first use of the domain
name. 4 5 Defendant claimed that it selected the domain name
"teletech.com" because it was unaware that "tele-tech.com" (with
a hyphen) could be used as a domain name. The court found
that "the reason why Defendant adopted the diluting domain
name is not relevant" for purposes of the motion at issue. 4 6
Although defendant had invested a considerable amount of
resources in the domain name "teletech.com," the court
enjoined defendant's use because of plaintiff's superior trade-
mark rights.14 7
In Interstellar Starship Services Ltd. v. Epix, Inc.,' Epix had
registered the trademark "EPIX" with respect to "printed circuit
boards and computer programs for image acquisition, process-
ing, display and transmission."' 4 9 Interstellar Starship registered
the domain name "epix.com" to publicize the activities of a thea-
tre group called the "Rocky Horror Picture Show."1 50 Although
Interstellar Starship also owned a consulting business in the field
of "design for test" circuit boards, its "epix.com" site was used
solely to publicize the Rocky Horror Picture Show. The court
concluded it was therefore unlikely to confuse any actual or
potential customer seeking to purchase printed circuit boards
and computer programs from Epix.1 5 ' Accordingly, the court
held that Interstellar Starship did not infringe Epix's trademark.
5. Concurrent Trademark Rights
Because trademark law recognizes that multiple parties may
have trademark rights to the same mark, but the Internet
domain name system permits only one user of a given domain
name, disputes will inevitably arise between two concurrent
144. 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
145. See id. at 1410.
146. Id. at 1413.
147. See id. at 1412. The court determined that the balance of hardships
tipped sharply in favor of the plaintiff because "[d]efendant's use of the
domain name 'teletech.com' prevents Plaintiff from using its company name
and registered service mark as its domain name, while Defendant is free to use,
and in fact has started using, the domain name "tele-tech.com" as an alternative
domain name." Id.
148. 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or. 1997).
149. Id. at 1333.
150. Id. at 1336.
151. See id.
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trademark holders over the same domain name. Although there
are no reported cases, these battles may be determined by tradi-
tional trademark infringement law. 1 52 As long as the use of a
mark as a domain name in no way confuses the public as to the
source of goods or services, the courts may permit the prevailing
"first come, first served" registration policy to govern the out-
come of domain name disputes between concurrent trademark
holders.
C. Content Liability
Web commerce and communication increase the potential
for false advertising, defamation, and securities law violations
because the Web provides relatively inexperienced users with
easy access to global audiences and perhaps greater opportuni-
ties for consumer confusion. The nature of the Internet-pro-
viding instant digital copies anywhere in the world-also makes
copyright issues particularly important. Because the perpetrators
of defamation and infringement in cyberspace may be anony-
mous or pseudononymous, and those perpetrators receive their
forum from online access providers or ISPs, those access provid-
ers and ISPs often find themselves named as defendants. At the
same time, the need to vigilantly curb online abuses and hold
culpable parties responsible must be tempered by the need to
minimize regulations that will chill the free and constructive
development of the Internet.
1. False Advertising, Securities Violations, and Defamation
Web sites that advertise products or services may be subject
to liability if they are misleading. Federal challenges to false
advertising and unfair business practices are usually brought
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,' 5 3 which prohibits the use of a
false or misleading description or representation in connection
with goods or services.' 5 4 The FTC is presently determining the
152. "While courts have not yet decided such a case, there is no reason
that they cannot be handled like any other traditional trademark infringement
case." Chris Bovenkamp, Does the Bottle Need to Be Broken: The Future of
Trademarks and Domain Names (Revised Nov. 18, 1996) <http://www.law.ttu.
edu/cyberspc/jour 11.htm#tech>.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
154. Id. To prevail, a plaintiff must prove that the promotional statement
was (1) false or misleading, (2) in interstate commerce, (3) in connection with
goods or services, (4) in commercial advertising or promotion, (5)
misrepresentative of the nature, qualities, or geographic origin of the goods,
services, or commercial activities, and (6) actually or likely damaging to the
plaintiff. See McCARTHY, supra note 34, § 27:24, at 27-39.
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extent to which it will apply consumer protection regulations of
the FTCA to Internet commerce, including the form of con-
sumer disclosures it will require in electronic advertising.155 In
addition, because a Web site may be accessed anywhere in the
world, its content may be judged under the laws of states or other
countries which set forth their own false advertising and unfair
practices statutes or specific requirements for Web commerce.' 5 6
If the Web site is owned by a public company, statements on
the site may also give rise to liability under state and federal
securities laws, to the extent those statements are misleading,
lack meaningful disclaimers or cautionary language, or provide
stale information despite their appearance of being up to
date.
15
Fundamental to the nature and promise of the Web are
"links" and "frames," which permit Internet users to move from
one site to another with the click of a computer mouse. 15 8 Nev-
ertheless, maintaining links to or frames of other sites may give
rise to claims under the federal Lanham Act,'
59 Copyright Act, 160
and state causes of action for false advertising or unfair competi-
155. The Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), prohibits "[u]nfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). The FTC will find deception if "there is a
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." See
Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986). See also
supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997) (defining
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices); § 17500 (West 1997)
(prohibiting false advertising); § 17506 (West 1997) (providing penalties for
unfair competition); § 17538 (West 1997) (requiring vendors on the Internet,
as well as vendors using traditional telephone, mail, and catalog media, to
disclose their return and refund policies and legal name and address); CAL. CFV.
CODE §§ 17 70(a), 1780(a) (West 1997) (providing cause of action under
Consumers Legal Remedies Act for misrepresentations concerning goods).
157. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
158. Clicking on a hyperlink (which appears as highlighted text on a Web
page) transports the user to another site or another page within the same site.
Clicking on certain other symbols or text does not actually transport the user to
another site, but displays another site within a "frame" that often displays the
original site's logo or advertising.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994). See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied
Anagramics, Inc., No. CV 97-6991 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, at *10 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 30, 1998) (unauthorized framing of plaintiff's Web site by defendant
competitor, with defendant's logo on the frame, stated claim for copyright
infringement).
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tion, 161 particularly if the link or frame does not clearly distin-
guish between the original site and the linked or framed site.
Many Web sites host forums or bulletin boards on which sub-
scribers or other visitors may post messages. The ability to com-
municate with vast numbers of readers at little or no cost-and
often anonymously-has encouraged the widespread dissemina-
tion of offensive or defamatory material on the Internet.
Although those who post such messages may be liable for defa-
mation, their frequent anonymity, the relative deep pockets of
the company hosting the forum or bulletin board, and the func-
tion of access providers as gatekeepers to cyberspace, often result
in defamation lawsuits against ISPs, BBS operators, and other
access providers.'
62
Significant litigation has addressed whether an ISP may be
liable for defamatory messages posted by subscribers. Courts
have held that the ISP would be strictly liable if it exercised con-
trol over content and was thus a "publisher," but it would not be
liable, absent knowledge of the defamation, if it were merely a
"distributor" of the underlying message.
16 3
161. In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 97-3055 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Apr. 28, 1997), Microsoft linked its Seattle Sidewalk Web site to internal
pages of Ticketmaster's Web site. Ticketmaster sued Microsoft for trademark
dilution, violations of the Lanham Act, and violation of state unfair trade
practices laws. In Washington Post Co. v. TotalNews, Inc., Case No. 97 Civ. 1190
(PKL) (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 20, 1997), defendant owned and operated a Web
site that framed the sites of plaintiff newspapers, while running its own
advertisements on the site as well. Plaintiffs brought claims for, among other
things, misappropriation, trademark dilution, trademark infringement, and
copyright infringement. The case settled, with defendants agreeing to link, but
not frame, plaintiffs' sites.
162. The resources and sophistication of online access providers vary
greatly. America Online has over 10 million subscribers. See Chris Albritton,
America Online Tops 10 Million Subscribers: Half of U.S. Households on Internet Use
Service, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1997, at D3. Some BBSs, on the other hand, are
extremely small operations run from a home.
163. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
allegedly defamatory statements about plaintiff appeared on a forum sponsored
by online service provider CompuServe. Plaintiff sued CompuServe. The court
held that CompuServe was the equivalent of a library, was entitled to the same
First Amendment protection as a news vendor, and therefore would be subject
to liability for infringement only if it knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory statements. The court held that CompuServe was not
liable because it had no more editorial control over the publication than a
library or bookstore or newsstand and it would not be feasible for CompuServe
to examine and protect against potentially defamatory material. In Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 26, 1995), Prodigy was held to be a "publisher" and therefore subject to
liability for defamation regardless of actual or imputed knowledge, for allegedly
defamatory messages posted by an anonymous Prodigy subscriber on a bulletin
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Under § 230(c) (1) of the Communications Decency Act, 164
ISPs are now immune from liability for information originating
with a subscriber. Although § 230(c) (1) provides by its terms
that ISPs and other providers or users shall not be treated as the
"publisher or speaker" of information originating from someone
else, the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,165 has
interpreted § 230(c) to bar liability for ISPs even if they could be
characterized under prior cases as a "distributor."
'1 66
In Zeran, a subscriber to America Online ("AOL") posted
plaintiffs name and phone number on advertisements for
offensive t-shirts celebrating the bombing of the Oklahoma City
federal building. Zeran complained to AOL, which removed the
notice, but the notice reappeared repeatedly. Zeran was bom-
barded with hostile and offensive telephone messages. Zeran
sued AOL for negligence on the ground that AOL knowingly dis-
tributed defamatory material. 67 The court held that § 230(c) (1)
preempted Zeran's state claim and provided immunity for
ISPs.'68 Although § 230 referred to "publishers," the court con-
cluded that the term embraced all editorial functions, including
board. The court distinguished Cubby because Prodigy held itself out as a
family-oriented service that exercised control over the content of the messages
on its bulletin board, and in fact regulated the content by promulgating
content guidelines and utilizing pre-screening software.
164. Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509 ("On-line
Family Empowerment"), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. 11 1996). Section 230(c),
entitled "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive
material," provides in part:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access
to material [provided by another information content provider].
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2).
165. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
166. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 230(c)(1) provides as
follows: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Congress intended the
provision to overrule Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 26, 1995). See 142 Cong. Rec. 41078 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (Conference
report on S. 652 by Rep. Bliley).
167. See id. at 329.
168. See id. at 331.
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whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content. 169 The
court explained that the immunity of § 230(c) is intended to
remove the disincentives ISPs would otherwise have to monitor
the communications made by their subscribers, while avoiding
the chilling effect on free speech that would result if ISPs had to
regulate content under the specter of strict liability.
1 70
2. Copyright Infringement
The ease of copying material on the Internet, the quality of
digital copies, and the global scope of distribution make copy-
right protection in cyberspace more important, yet more diffi-
cult. The technology of cyberspace also makes copyright analysis
more complex, because a number of "copies" of works are made
automatically (and often without the knowledge of users) during
the transmission process.
Copyright protection subsists in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, including literary
works, music, graphics, pictures, and video.1 71 With certain
exceptions, the owner of the copyright to that work has the
exclusive right to copy, distribute, perform, and display the work
and prepare derivative works based upon it.1 7 2 A person who
commits any of those acts without the permission of the copy-
right holder may be liable for direct copyright infringement.
Thus, those who place an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted
work on the Internet are liable for direct copyright infringement.
In addition, the BBS operator or other third party that distributes
the unauthorized copy may be liable for direct infringement of
the copyright holder's exclusive right of distribution, whether
the third party knew the material was infringing or not.1
7
1
Technically, a BBS operator or Internet access provider
makes a "copy" of an infringing document automatically during
the process of transmitting the original infringer's message.
These automatic copies, however, do not give rise to direct copy-
right infringement.174 Nonetheless, a BBS operator, ISP, or
169. See id. at 332.
170. See id. at 333. Section 230(c)(1) expressly preempts inconsistent
state laws, but does not prevent states from enforcing laws consistent with the
purpose of the Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(d) (3) (1994).
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
173. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1562 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
174. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs.
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-70 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("the mere fact that Netcom's
system incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiffs' works does not mean
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other third party may still be liable for copyright infringement
perpetrated by someone else, based on theories of contributory
or vicarious infringement.
Contributory copyright infringement may arise if a BBS
operator (1) knew of the infringement and (2) materially con-
tributed to it (e.g., by providing the means and encouragement)
or substantially participated in it (e.g., by failing to cancel the
infringing message). In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. IAPHIA,'75 for
example, defendants operated a bulletin board service on which
subscribers were uploading and downloading unauthorized cop-
ies of Sega's videogames. The court found that defendants could
be liable for contributory infringement because they encouraged
subscribers to upload and download the unauthorized copies
and marketed hardware and software that could be used to make
the unauthorized copies. 76 In Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,177 the court held that
an online service provider could be liable for contributory
infringement if it could be shown that the provider knew or
should have known of a user's copyright infringement after
receiving notice from plaintiffs and failing to investigate.
Vicarious copyright liability may arise where the defendant
(1) had the right and ability to control the wrongdoer (e.g., by
shutting off access) and (2) received a direct financial benefit
from the infringement.'78
Pending legislation may limit liability for contributory or
vicarious copyright infringement. In May 1998, the Senate
approved the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998179 which,
among other things, would limit the scope of service providers'
liability for copyright infringement. Essentially, ISPs would not
be liable for merely transmitting infringing material. Additional
legislation has been proposed to limit ISP liability on a similar
basis.180
Netcom has caused the copying," and direct infringement requires some
element of volition).
175. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994), modified 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
176. See Sega Enters., 857 F. Supp. at 686-87.
177. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
178. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. The court held that Netcom could
not be vicariously liable because it did not receive a direct financial benefit
from the infringement. See id. at 1377.
179. S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998).
180. See, e.g., the On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997) (no direct or vicarious liability for copyright
infringement for ISPs who did not place the material online, select or alter
content, determine recipients of the material, benefit financially from the
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D. Online and Shrinkwrap Contracting: Proposed UCC Article 2B
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") provides a source
of uniform contract law in the United States. All fifty states have
adopted the UCC, albeit with slight variations.' 81 Article 2 of the
current UCC addresses contracts for the sale of goods. Article 2A
addresses leases of goods. Out of concern that the UCC still may
not adequately address novel issues arising from electronic com-
merce, new provisions governing the sale or license of software
programs and the license of other information may be added as
UCC Article 2B.
18 2
At its core, proposed Article 2B attempts to adapt longstand-
ing contract principles to the digital age, in which transactions
are often consummated without the execution of a written agree-
ment. First, Article 2B replaces the concept of a "writing" with
the concept of a "record," which is defined as "information
inscribed on a tangible medium or stored in an electronic or
other medium and retrievable in perceivable form."' Second,
it expands the concept of "manifestation of assent," required
under common law and existing UCC provisions for the forma-
tion of a contract. Under Article 2B, a person, or its electronic
agent, manifests assent to a record or term in the record if, after
the opportunity for review, the person or electronic agent
(1) "authenticates" the record or term, (2) intends to engage in
affirmative conduct and has reason to know the other party may
infer assent, or (3) engages in affirmative conduct clearly indicat-
ing acceptance. 184 A record or term may be "authenticated" by
infringement, endorse or advertise the material, or know the material was
infringing); The Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act
of 1997, S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997) (protection from liability for services that
transmit, route, or provide connections for real-time communication formation
such as e-mail, for services such as hyperlinks, indexes, and search engines, and
for parties who do not exercise control over content).
181. See U.C.C., Table ofJurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted,
1 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1998). See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1101-16104 (West 1964
& 1990 & Supp. 1998).
182. Article 2B is a joint effort of the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It may be
added to the UCC by the summer of 1999, and may be before state legislators
for adoption as state law a few months thereafter. The text of the current draft
of proposed Article 2B may be found at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/
ulc/ucc2b/2bALId98.htm>.
183. U.C.C. Article § 2B-102(a)(40) (Proposed Draft December 1998).
Citations to Article 2B refer to its December 1998 draft.
184. See id. § 2B-111. The requirement of an opportunity to review the
record or term is met only if it is reasonably available and noticeable and, in
some instances, there is a right to a refund if the term or record is rejected. See
id. § 2B-112.
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any commercially reasonable method, such as clicking on an on-
screen button that says "I agree" or words to that effect."8 5
Under certain conditions, the contract may be formed entirely
between "electronic agents"-computer programs or other auto-
mated means of initiating or responding to electronic
messages 86"-without the immediate knowledge or review of any
human being."8 7 Parties can vary the effect of Article 2B's provi-
sions by agreement.
One of the controversial provisions in proposed Article 2B
confirms the enforceability of "shrinkwrap" or "click-through"
license agreements. Shrinkwrap license agreements are often
included inside prepackaged software, and set forth the terms of
the purchase or license of the software. Although a sticker on
the outside "shrinkwrap" of the package may notify the customer
that use of the software is subject to further terms, the customer
does not see those terms until after purchasing the software and
opening it. A similar arrangement for transactions conducted
online is often referred to as a "click-through" license agreement.
A user or purchaser of software on-line must click "I agree" or
make some other affirmative act, and thus become bound to the
stated terms, before being able to access the software.
Arguably, a shrinkwrap license could be deemed unenforce-
able as an adhesion contract, forced upon consumers by vendors
with superior bargaining power."88 At least one court has
decided that, if the parties' negotiations have been sufficient to
form a contract, the terms subsequently unveiled in a shrinkwrap
format might be viewed as proposed modifications, which would
not be enforceable without actual assent.'8 9 Recent decisions,
however, generally favor enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses, at
least where the purchaser receives notice on the outside of the
package that additional terms are included inside, and the pur-
chaser has the option of receiving a full refund after reviewing
those terms.' 90
185. See id. § 2B-111, Reporter's Notes 4 & 5, Illustration 1. See also id.
§ 2B-114 (commercial reasonableness of attribution procedure).
186. See id. § 2B-102(a)(21).
187. See id. § 2B-119 & Reporter's Notes.
188. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D.
La. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). An adhesion contract is a
standardized contract imposed by a party of superior bargaining strength, on a
"take it or leave it" basis.
189. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991).
190. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), the court
enforced a shrinkwrap license which restricted use of data on an accompanying
CD-ROM database to noncommercial purposes. The court reasoned that not
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Article 2B addresses shrinkwrap and click-through license
agreements under the rubric of "mass market licenses." Under
Article 2B, a mass market license is a standard form that is pre-
pared for and used in a "mass market transaction," which gener-
ally includes all consumer transactions and some transactions
involving businesses.191 A party is bound by all of the terms in a
mass market license, whether or not the terms were actually
known or understood, as long as the party agrees or manifests
assent at or before the initial use of or access to the information.
Article 2B would give customers greater protection than they
have under current law. If the customer does not like the post-
sale terms, under Article 2B it can return the product, and the
licensor must bear the costs of return. Furthermore, Article 2B
extends these protections to business customers as well as indi-
vidual consumers.
On the other hand, Article 2B would expand the circum-
stances in which shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses would be
enforceable. While post-sale terms have been enforced when cir-
cumstances made it impractical to require all of the terms to be
stated at the point of sale, post-sale terms could be enforced
under Article 2B even where the licensor could have conve-
niently spelled out the terms before the sale. In addition, Arti-
cle 2B permits contract terms to change continuously over the
life of a mass market contract. Under Article 2B-304, a user must
be notified of any such change, but this notice might be accom-
plished by merely posting changes on a Web page or other acces-
sible location the user knows about, rather than providing notice
to the consumer directly. Upon discovering the change, the cus-
tomer may cancel the contract if the change is unacceptable and
all the terms of a contract have to be spelled out at the outset, at least if the
buyer may receive a full refund after reviewing the complete terms. The court
also noted it would be impractical to require software vendors to state all terms
outside the package at the point of sale. On similar grounds, the court in Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 47
(1997), enforced an arbitration clause that was inside the package, based on the
user's mere failure to object to the clause.
191. Specifically, the December 1998 draft of Article 2B-102(a)(33)
defines a mass market transaction as "a consumer transaction" or "a transaction
with an end-user license which transaction involves information or
informational rights directed to the general public as a whole under
substantially the same terms for the same information." The definition
excludes certain transactions including customized work specially prepared for
the licensee, public performances, site licenses, and redistribution and access
contracts. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(a) (32) (A)-(E) (Proposed Draft December 1998)
(visited Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2b/
2bALId98.htm>.
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the term is material, but apparently cannot opt to continue the
contract upon its original terms.
19 2
Finally, Article 2B may be preempted by federal copyright
law, which permits the public to use copyrighted material
(including software) for certain purposes, such as the purpose of
"fair use," without any license at all. By enforcing the terms of a
shrinkwrap license, Article 2B would give licensors more power
than they would have under the Copyright Act, and to that
extent be contrary to the terms or intent of that Act. Indeed, in
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,19 3 the court refused to give
effect to a Louisiana state shrinkwrap law purporting to validate
license restrictions against backup copying, modifying software
and reverse engineering, holding that the law was preempted by
provisions of the Copyright Act which permit such uses.194 In
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg" 5 on the other hand, the court held
there was no preemption because, whether the material was pro-
tected by copyright law or not, the parties could enforce the
terms of private contracts.1 96
E. Privacy
As transactions proliferate on the Web, customers grow
increasingly concerned about privacy, especially when they are
required to provide personal information in order to complete a
transaction. While users are particularly concerned about the
security of their medical or financial information, they are often
unaware, and disturbed to discover, that personal information is
also collected and stored without their knowledge in the form of
"cookies." A "cookie" is a file generated by the Web browser on
the user's hard drive in response to directions from a Web site
the user has visited. The cookie keeps information about the
user or the visit and provides it to the Web site each time the user
revisits the site.197
192. Nevertheless, customers would still be protected against
unconscionable terms under Article 2B-208(a) (1).
193. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
194. See id. at 269-70.
195. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
196. See id. at 1454-55.
197. There is some benefit to these cookies, because they relieve users
from having to re-enter certain information each time they visit the site. Some
companies, however, sell the personal information obtained from users to third
parties, or track the user's "click stream"-showing all the Web sites the user
has opened. A service or access provider may maintain a record of a user's e-
mail communications as well.
1999]
174 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
No federal statute specifically prohibits the collection or dis-
tribution of personal information collected online,198 although
numerous bills have been introduced in Congress.199 The FTC,
however, has announced four elements critical to the protection
of consumer privacy: (1) notice to consumers about how per-
sonal information2 " collected online is used; (2) choice for con-
sumers about whether and how their personal information is
used; (3) security of personal information including reasonable
steps by data collectors to guard against loss or misuse; and
(4) access for consumers to their own personal information to
ensure accuracy.
201
The IFTC will apparently take an aggressive position with
respect to the online collection of data from children. In July
1997, after investigating an interactive Web site that targeted chil-
dren, the FTC set forth the following guidelines: (1) "[i]t is a
deceptive practice to represent that a Web site is collecting per-
sonally identifiable information from a child for a particular pur-
pose" when it will also be used for another purpose (such as
marketing), without a disclosure; (2) any such disclosure must be
made to the parent; (3) for a notice to be adequate, it should
include "who is collecting the personally identifiable informa-
tion, what information is being collected, its intended use(s), to
198. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 prohibits,
among other things, the interception of e-mail. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994). It
also prohibits unauthorized disclosure of or access to stored electronic
communications. See id. § 2701.
199. The Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act,
H.R. 1964, 105th Cong. (1997), would require the Frc to announce rules
ensuring that consumers (1) have knowledge that consumer information is
being collected about them, (2) receive conspicuous notice that the
information could be provided to third parties for purposes unrelated to the
transaction, and (3) be allowed to exercise control over the collection of
personal information. The proposed Data Privacy Act, H.R. 2368, 105th Cong.
(1997), calls for the computer industry to (1) develop voluntary guidelines for
notifying customers before collecting information, (2) advise customers of third
party recipients, and (3) allow customers access to verify their personal data and
prohibit disclosure. See also Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1997,
H.R. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting disclosure of subscriber's personally
identifiable information by a computer service without prior written consent);
Children's Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment Act of 1997,
H.R. 1972 and S. 504, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting sales of personal
information about children without consent of a parent).
200. The FTC defines "personal identifying information" to include
name, physical and e-mail address, phone number, and information that is
identifiable to a specific individual. GeoCities; Analysis to Aid Public
Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. 44624, 44625 (1998).
201. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FTC, PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON
CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1996).
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whom and in what form it will be disclosed to third parties, and
the means by which parents may prevent the retention, use, or
disclosure of the information."
20 2
In 1998, the FTC accused GeoCities, an ISP, of disclosing
members' personal information to third parties in violation of
GeoCities' stated privacy policy, misrepresenting to whom chil-
dren's personally identifiable information would be disclosed,
and failing to identify how it would use member information.
GeoCities entered into a consent decree by which it agreed to
post on its Web site a clear and prominent privacy notice that
would (1) give adequate notice of GeoCities' information and
disclosure practices; (2) provide users the ability to delete their
personal information from GeoCities' databases; and (3) clearly
identify its affiliation with third parties that may collect informa-
tion. In addition, GeoCities will have to obtain parental consent
before collecting and using personal information obtained from
children under thirteen.2 °3
The laws of individual states and foreign countries may also
impose obligations with respect to data collection.20 4 The Euro-
pean Union's Data Protection Directive, for example, is requir-
ing member countries to maintain laws protecting personal
information. It also prohibits companies operating in the EU
from transmitting personal data electronically to countries lack-
ing adequate protections for the information.0 5
One means of helping to secure private information is data
encryption. In general, encryption is a process that converts data
into a form that cannot be read without a decryption key. The
longer (and thus more sophisticated) the string of code in the
decryption key, the more secure the information. Due to the
Federal Government's national security concerns, however, fed-
eral laws currently prohibit the exportation of more sophisti-
cated encryption technology unless law enforcement has access
202. Letter from Jodie Bernstein, Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection, to Kathryn C. Montgomery, President of the Center for Media
Education, and Jeffrey A. Chester, Executive Director of the Center for Media
Education (July 15, 1997) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/9707/cenmed.htm>.
203. See GeoCities; Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. 44624,
(1998). The full text of the consent agreement can be found on the FTC home
page at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/98081/geo-ord.htm>.
204. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1 (including privacy as a fundamental
inalienable right); Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42
(1976) (recognizing private cause of action based on California Constitution,
article I, § 1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625B (1977).
205. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 95/46 1995 O.J. (L281) on the "Protection of
Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data." The Directive took effect in October 1998.
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to the decryption keys.206 Companies must therefore develop
different encryption methods for domestic and export use, which
is impractical, or offer only weak encryption, which may not gen-
erate the public confidence necessary for the future of commer-
cial transactions. Meanwhile, foreign encryption products are
proliferating, putting U.S. encryption products at a competitive
disadvantage. Pending legislation known as the "Encryption Pro-
tects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and Abuse in
Cyberspace (E-PRIVACY) Act, ' '207 would ease federal restrictions
on the export of encryption products.
III. CONCLUSION
The turn of the century brings exciting opportunities for
commerce, education, and entertainment as cyberspace grows
larger and the physical world becomes effectively smaller. This
potential, however, does not come without challenges. Compa-
nies must protect themselves from the disruption of the Y2K
problem and the litigation that will inevitably occur. Web site
owners must take care not to become unduly subject to foreign
laws and distant forums and sacrifice the benefits of interactivity
with users. There must be a fair process for allocating Web site
domains, a balance of the Internet's frontier character and regu-
lations protecting against abuses, and privacy measures sufficient
to assure the public that Internet commerce is secure.
In particular, companies should expect a number of legal
developments in the dawning of the twenty-first century. First, it
will be increasingly important for companies to document their
diligence in assessing Y2K problems (including those caused by
the Y2K shortcomings of vendors, information suppliers, and
others), establishing and implementing Y2K solutions, testing
them, and developing contingency plans. Second, as companies
fail to meet business obligations due to Y2K problems, they will
seek to shift losses and deflect responsibility by bringing claims
for negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and indemnification
against third parties. Third, Y2K problems will provide plaintiffs'
lawyers further ammunition in arguing that the securities of pub-
lic companies were sold without adequate disclosure of material
facts. Fourth, companies will need to be more vigilant about the
content of their Web sites, guarding against stale information,
misleading information, trademark and copyright infringement,
206. See Int'l Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1998);
Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
207. S. 2067 (1998).
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and inappropriate links. Fifth, false advertising claims under
common law and the FTCA will increase, particularly in the areas
of Y2K disclosures, online privacy, and advertising on the Web.
Sixth, legislators will attempt to address Y2K and online com-
merce by introducing legislation, but they will likely find that
technology moves too quickly for the legislative process. Only as
the law and industry resolve these issues, will the promise of
twenty-first century technology come to fruition.

